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Judicial review for fidelity to legislative and constitutional commands – the classic 
understanding of the rule of law – is today complemented by scrutiny for policy rationality, 
adherence to fundamental rights, and compliance with procedural guarantees.
2
 
Simultaneously, our understanding of the lawmaking process has become more sophisticated 
with more attention for rational output and evaluation on the one hand and deliberation and 
participation on the other. This twofold development has paved the way for analyses of the 
(changing) dynamics between the legislature and the judiciary. Shapiro has even called the 
relationship between judicial review and the‘deliberative move’ – the trend towards infusing 
decision-making processes with greater opportunities for participation and reasoning – the key 
question for EU administrative law in the years to come.
3
 Scott and Sturm have revealed how 
courts through their interpretation of standing rules and their choice for a certain standard of 
review can influence the dynamics between citizens and institutions in legislative and 
administrative arenas, by providing “an incentive structure for participation, transparency, 
principled decision-making, and accountability”
4
. They famously classified the European 
Union (EU) courts as ‘catalysts’ by showing – among other things – how certain European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings on standing had a direct link to the right to participate in ‘new 
governance’.  This socio-legal study still stands more or less on its own though. The 
connection between regulatory politics and judicial decision-making is still unclear, both in 
empirical and conceptual terms. Shapiro’s plea for rules and regulation to be the central object 
of administrative law as opposed to the particular applications of regulatory norms to 
individuals is still salient almost ten years after it was made.
5
 Although the suggested focus is 
certainly not yet a reality for EU administrative law, as EU rulemaking becomes more 
intrusive, demands for increased participation rights on the one hand and more intense judicial 
review on the other are noticeable. One factor here is that a lot of rules issued in the EU 
context have profound effects for third country nationals, especially in the trade domain. The 
existence of regulatory stakeholders who are not EU citizens has sparked an interest in the 
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institutional structure of the EU, beyond the territorial borders of the EU.
6
 Explain the 
fundamentals of the EU system of judicial review to an American lawyer and chances are he 
or she will be surprised or even outraged. “How can you claim to have ‘better regulation’ 
when individual citizens cannot even – as a general rule - file for judicial review of 
regulations?”, is a not uncommon reaction at seminars dedicated to the development of 
regulatory policy in the EU. This area is currently governed by ‘Better Regulation’ policy as a 
normative and procedural framework. This horizontal policy is to be distinguished from ‘new 
governance’ in the sense that it applies techniques  that are more or less ‘new’ to EU policy 
making such as impact assessment, to ‘old’ instruments such as directives and regulations. 
The Better Regulation programme employs a twofold strategy. On the one hand there are 
stricter procedural conditions for lawmaking processes, such as consultation requirements. On 
the other hand the strategy relies on the operationalization of enhanced substantive quality 
requirements such as proportionality through instruments such as impact assessment. 
Although there is an emerging literature on the implications of Better Regulation on judicial 
review,
7
 the issue of standing has not received much attention as of yet.
8
 Now that the first 
case on the exact interpretation of the new standing rules has been decided – at the instigation 
of third country nationals
9
 - it is appropriate to think through the implications for the way we 
conceive of legislation/regulation at the EU level in the era of Better Regulation. Does the 
institutional structure as refined by the ECJ in its recent case law support or undermine efforts 
to improve the quality of EU rules through stricter procedural conditions and enhanced 
substantive quality requirements? A related issue is the development of the relationship 
between legislation proper and ‘lower’ forms of rulemaking in the EU. The Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced a clearer idea of ‘hierarchy’ between primary norms (legislative acts) and derived 
norms (non-legislative acts), whilst retaining a formal approach to the definition of either 
category. The Better Regulation strategy on the other hand, has pushed in the other direction, 
namely that of a more substantive treatment of ‘regulation’ and a problem driven approach to 
finding the right type of instrument. The recent expansion of the requirement to carry out an 
impact assessment not only to policy initiatives and proposals for legislative acts but also to 
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Against the background of these simultaneous but not always aligned developments in the 
field of EU regulatory and legislative policy – Treaty induced versus Better Regulation 
induced - this contribution takes up the perspective of judicial-regulatory dynamics and 
applies it to the recent change in locus standi (standing rights) for individual applicants. 
Article 263 TFEU significantly widens the standing rules for non-privileged applicants (i.e. 
other than Member States or EU institutions and bodies) by adding a new limb stating that if 
the act appealed against is ‘regulatory’ and ‘does not entail implementing measures’, 
applicants merely need to demonstrate ‘direct concern’ and do not need to worry about 
showing ‘individual concern’. To be precise, the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (ex-
Article 230(4)), provides that “[a]ny natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid 
down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that 
person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act 
which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures”.
11
 With the 
removal of the requirement of individual concern for appeals against certain types of acts, it 
became possible that non-privileged applicants no longer need to pass the ‘Plaumann test’
12
 in 
all cases, a test that had proven to exclude all measures of a general nature in practice (see 
section on pre-Lisbon case law).  
For almost two years since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the question to what 
extent this Treaty had brought a change to the issue of standing was up in the air. Legal 
commentators differed as to the scope of the new exception introduced in Article 263(4) 
TFEU.
13
 Would the new Article 263(4) TFEU allow private litigants to challenge regulations 
even when they are legislative acts within the meaning of Article 289(3) TFEU? Some 
commentators argued in favour of such a broad interpretation.
14
 Hofmann, Rowe & Türk too, 
in their new handbook on EU Administrative Law, argue that justification for equating 
‘regulatory acts’ with ‘regulations’ is lacking and that the concept “should be applicable to 
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any act of general application irrespective of its form”.
15
 At the same time, it is hard to sustain 
that ‘regulatory act’ should be the umbrella term, when the distinction between ‘legislative’ 
and ‘non-legislative’ acts was so carefully crafted in the new TFEU.
16
 On the other hand, if 
the ‘masters of the Treaty’ meant to limit the new standing option to “non-legislative acts of 
general application”, why did they not just use that terminology?
17
  
The anticipated EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights also has a part to 
play in the discussion.
18
 In fact, the main line of debate on this issue was cast in terms of a 
possible violation of the principle of effective judicial protection as laid down in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and now also in Article 19 of 
the Treaty on the European Union.19 This contribution, however, focuses on a different aspect of 
the developments, namely the implications for the dynamics in the ‘lawmaking’ or 
‘rulemaking’ phase in the light of the recent judicial interpretations.
20
  
Standing rights and regulation 
 
The EU is often struggling with familiar concepts of public law, even those that tend to apply 
across legal orders and cultures. In fact, when it comes to both of the concepts central to this 
contribution, locus standi and ‘regulation’, the EU legal system seems to still be finding its 
feet. For instance there is the awkward classification of directives and regulations as 
‘secondary legislation’, whereas these instruments are the result of a process that comes 
closest to what in most countries would count as the ‘primary lawmaking process’. The 
Lisbon Treaty fixed the terminological confusion to some extent, by introducing a distinction 
between legislative acts and non-legislative acts (Articles 290 and 291 in the consolidated 
version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). At the same time, new terminological 
confusion has been created by introducing the term ‘regulatory act’,
21
 which does not sit 
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easily with the regular Treaty terminology. However, the use of the term ‘regulatory’ can be 
traced back to the days of the Convention called to prepare a constitutional text, when a 
distinction between ‘legislative measures’ and ‘regulatory measures’ was first contemplated.
22
 
Since the recent case law of the ECJ could give rise to a distinctive meaning of the term 
‘regulatory act’ in the EU context, I will use the term ‘rulemaking’ and ‘rules’ as generic 
words throughout this contribution, despite the disadvantage that those terms carry a specific 
meaning in the American context. The current Treaties do not define the category of 
‘legislative acts’ in substantive terms, but do tie it to a certain procedure to be followed. All 
other acts of a general nature are either delegated acts or implementing acts, again depending 
on formal characteristics. The distinction between directives and regulations cuts right 
through this new ‘hierarchy of norms’, which means that directives and regulations can be 
‘legislative’, but also ‘delegated’ or ‘implementing’.  
Then there is the complicated mechanism that regulates the access to the courts. In the EU 
judicial system, all applicants for judicial review that are not Member States, the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank 
or the Committee of the Regions are deemed ‘non-privileged’ for the purpose of access to the 
court. This category of non-privileged applicants included bodies, offices and agencies of the 
European Union. No further distinction is made between natural persons and legal persons. In 
practice, “where regulatory rule-making is involved, those complaining of rights violations 
are likely to be large corporations”.
23
 Individual citizens with an incentive to bring an action 
against a measure of a general nature are likely to combine their resources and be represented 
by interest groups.  
Another filter for the group of potential applicants is the relatively high standards of 
review the ECJ applies for measures taken at the EU level – for instance, the ECJ is famously 
more lenient towards the EU institutions when assessing proportionality than it is to Member 
State legislatures. Craig and De Búrca have argued that it is ‘reductionist’ to use a strict test 
for standing in order to minimize the number of actions brought when the ECJ could do the 
same through setting the standards of review.
24
 
In order to fully understand the debate on standing rights in regulatory cases, it is 
important to note that it has never been the case that individual applicants cannot challenge 
EU rules in court at all. There is a sort of ‘multi-level’ judicial protection system in place: the 
ECJ will rule on the validity of EU legislation when cases involving private parties are 
referred to it by a national court in the context of a preliminary procedure. Of course this 
remedy entirely depends on national standing rules and on the willingness of national courts 
to issue a reference to the ECJ. It also involves a lengthy procecure, which means that a 
contested EU measure could have been implemented over a long period of time before the 
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ECJ rules it to be void. Finally the system leaves us with the strange situation that exactly in 
the case of EU Regulations, which apply directly without the link of national implementing 
measures, forging a way to the European Courts may prove impossible for individual 
applicants.  
Standing rights and participation  
 
The question whether and, if so, how the extent of participatory rights in the decision-making 
process should matter for the determination of standing rights, is a recurring one. One line of 
reasoning here is that when an actor has participated before the decision was taken, he/or she 
has been accepted as a dialogic partner by the public body and should therefore have standing 
in front of the courts.
25
 Applied in concrete terms to the EU context this involvement could 
help establish the ‘direct concern’ required for standing. Another possible logic is to say that 
standing rights should be granted as compensation for lack of participatory rights. The ECJ, in 
spite of its overall restrictive approach, seems to adhere to the former logic. When a Member 
State argued that participation rights before taking the decision justified lack of standing to 
appeal against the decision,
26
 the ECJ shot down this line of reasoning. Also, Scott and Sturm 
have drawn attention to an encouraging development in the “notoriously and scandalously 
restrictive”
27
 interpretation of standing requirements for nonprivileged actors by the ECJ, 
namely the rights-based reasoning that a person will be granted standing, where they enjoy 
“specific procedural guarantees conferring upon them a right to participate in the political 
process”.
28
 Thus, at least in cases regarding decision-making at the EU level, the ECJ appears 
to agree that “granting standing to those who have already enjoyed the privilege of political 
participation” is not merely a matter of “giving these actors ‘another bite in court’” but of  
“encouraging respect for participatory rights and respect for participants in the practice of 
governance”. The best illustration of this reasoning is found in the UEAPME case in which an 
interest group that was on the Commission’s list of organisations with a right to participate at 
the early stage of the ‘social dialogue’ was granted standing, partly on this basis. However, 
this case did not involve the regular lawmaking process; the lack of involvement on the part 
of the European Parliament was in fact an important factor in the ECJ’s decision, which 
mentioned that the ‘participation of the people’ must be assured in a different way. Therefore, 
the UEAPME case, although often hailed as a landmark case for the liberalization of standing 
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rights, could in fact work as a precedent against widening standing in cases involving 
legislative acts. 
 
Pre-Lisbon case law: restrictive on ‘individual concern’ 
 
As has already become clear from the aforementioned, one term comes to mind in particular 
when describing the ECJ’s approach to standing rights in cases involving acts not addressed 
to a particular person: restrictive.
29
 Especially the requirement of individual concern is 
extremely hard to satisfy for individual applicants, when appealing against acts of a general 
nature.
30
 Even in cases where the measure at hand allowed for a more or less exact 
determination of the number and identity of the persons to whom the measure applied, this was not 
sufficient for the ECJ. 
31
 In IPSO and USE v ECB the Court declared that “[a]s regards the 
admissibility of the application, the mere fact that a regulatory act may affect the legal 
situation of an individual cannot, as the Community judicial system stands at present, suffice 
to enable that individual to be regarded as directly and individually concerned by that act”
 32
. 
And in an additional observation the Court continued as follows: “Only the existence of 
specific circumstances by which a person is differentiated from all other persons and is 
thereby distinguished individually just as in the case of the person to whom a decision is 
addressed may enable that person to bring proceedings under the fourth paragraph of Article 
230 EC against an act having general scope”.
 33
 There are indeed some rare cases in which an 
individual appeal against a general measure has been admissible, but those exceptions are 
invariably tied up with the specific circumstances of the case, for instance when a regulation 
explicitly mentioned the special situation of the applicants as a consideration to be taken into 
account.
 34
 Thus, the judicial reading of the pre-Lisbon standing rules may be summarized as 
follows: “natural and legal persons [may] institute proceedings against decisions as acts of 
individual application and against acts of general application such as a regulation which is of 
direct concern to those persons and affects them by reason of certain attributes peculiar to 
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them, or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and 
distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee of a decision.”
35
 
The former CFI (now: General Court, GC) has attempted to relax the rules on standing 
in the past, notably in the Jégo-Quéré case,
36
 in which a group of fishermen asked the court to 
review  a Community Regulation that prohibited drift-net fishing and was granted standing 
through an innovative interpretation of the requirement of individual concern.
37
 The court – 
inspired by AG Jacobs’opinion in the UPA case
38
 - reasoned as follows: 
“...in order to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals, a natural or legal person is to 
be regarded as individually concerned by a Community measure of general application that 
concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal position, in a manner which 
is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him. 
The number and position of other persons who are likewise affected by the measure, or who 
may be so, are of no relevance in that regard”.
39
 
Then the court’s decision in UPA came and it was clear that by not following AG Jacobs’ line 
in this latter case Jégo-Quéré, too, would be overturned.
40
 In that decision the ECJ maintained 
its stance that a complete system of legal remedies was already available to EU citizens, as a 
result of the ‘multi-level’ remedy of asking a national court for a preliminary reference.
41
 The 
ECJ’s view that without ‘individual concern’, “an action for annulment (…) should not on any 
view be available” has lead to the odd situation. Due to national restrictions on standing 
sometimes applicants would have to even break the law and wait for the national authorities to 
bring proceedings against them in order to challenge the compatibility of the national 
provisions with Union law and hopefully – eventually – the interpretation or validity of the 
EU measure itself. The restrictive interpretation did not happen for neglect of the principle of 
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effective judicial protection, which was discussed explicitly by the Court in the UPA case and 
ultimately dismissed as a basis to extend the scope of then Article 230(4) EC.
42
 
The Court, also in extra-judicial communications,
43
 has always taken the view that a system in 
which the national courts are responsible for protecting the rights of individuals, satisfies the 
requirements essential for the effective judicial protection of those rights.
44
 However, in the 
context of the debate on a Constitution for Europe, the then President of the ECJ also 
conceded that whether or not to allow actions for annulment by private parties against 
measures of a general nature which concern them, is “first and foremost a policy choice”
45
. 
The idea that the Treaty, through what are now the Articles 267 and 263 TFEU, offers a 
“complete regime of legal protection” continued to be heavily criticized, paving the way for a 
textual reform as part of the (quasi-)constitutional deliberations taking place in the first 





Crafting the reform of Article 263 para 4 TFEU 
 
Since the Court of Justice had refused to go beyond a narrow textual interpretation in the 
matter it was left up to the masters of the Treaties to deal with the persisting dissatisfaction 
with the rules on standing.
47
 The Court in the UPA case had even made it clear explicitly that 
Treaty revision would be the only way to relax the standing requirements for non-privileged 
applicants.
48
 The Commission in a letter to the Secretary of the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee also explicitly conceded that the reforms of the standing rules 
induced by the Lisbon Treaty were meant to resolve the controversy surrounding the UPA and 
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 The revision materialised, but not in the capacity of a relaxation of the 
individuality requirement, but as a new category of acts that are appealable for non-privileged 
applicants.  
The introduction of a new category of ‘regulatory acts which are of direct concern to non-
privileged applicants and do not entail implementing measures’ goes back to the proposed 
Article III-365(4) of the Constitutional Treaty. Initially it was proposed to phrase the core of 
the new provision as ‘an act of general application’, a majority being in favour of this.
50
 The 
Praesidium in the end opted for the term ‘regulatory act’,
51
 on the grounds that this wording 
would enable a distinction to be made between legislative acts and regulatory acts, 
“maintaining a restrictive approach in relation to actions by individuals against legislative 
acts”.
52
 The desirability of such a distinction was explicitly tied to the choice to further a 
hierarchy of norms at the EU level: if this “were to become a reality, it would seem 
appropriate to continue to take a restrictive approach to actions by individuals against 
legislative measures and to provide for a more open approach with regard to actions against 
regulatory measures.”
53
 According to an official report it was even the broadly shared hope of 
the Members of the CFI that a distinction would be drawn between legislative measures and 
regulatory measures,
54




The provision became part of the Lisbon Treaty without any textual changes as Article 
263(4) TFEU, leaving commentators to wonder whether a broad interpretation
56
 (all general 
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measures?) or rather an narrow interpretation
57
 (only (some) non-legislative acts) was in 
order. On the basis of the new formulation, two critiques were articulated in the literature: 1) 
the phrase in the Treaty introduces new and unnecessary terminological confusion and 2) the 
relaxation does not go far enough and does not solve the problem that it is still incompatible 
with the principle of effective judicial protection.
58
 As mentioned, this contribution does not 
specifically elaborate upon the judicial protection argument. The next section sets out how the 
ECJ dealt with the fact that there is no definition of the term ‘regulatory acts’ in the Treaty 
and with the unclear relationship between this term and the terms legislative, non-legislative, 
implementing and delegated acts. 
 
Recent case law: still restrictive? 
 
Interestingly, even before the new provision allowing any natural or legal person to institute 
proceedings ‘against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or her and does not 
entail implementing measures’ ever became law, it was invoked in judicial proceedings in 
front of the European Courts, or the General Court to be precise. In Eridania Sadam 
and Others v Commission
59
 the applicants argued that the new provision was “purely 
declaratory” as it simply was an expression of the pre-existing right of effective recourse to a 
competent court. Therefore, since the applicants did not need the provision for standing rights 
that could be directly based on the principle of effective judicial protection, it did not matter 
that it had not yet entered into force. As expected, the Court did not follow this reasoning, 
since doing otherwise would deviate from the Court’s viewpoint that the principle of effective 
judicial protection cannot be a self-standing basis for standing rights. 
After the new provision entered into force there have been cases in which the non-
qualification of the contested measure as a ‘regulatory act’ was raised as part of a plea of 
inadmissability but since the application was already deemed inadmissable on other grounds, 
there was no reason for the Court to look into it.
60
 In Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta and Umicore 
v Commission
61
 the last phrase of Article 263 TFEU had been brought into the proceedings as 
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an argument, but the Court ruled that “even if the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, in 
particular the last phrase of the paragraph, could in the present case confer on the applicants a 
locus standi which they did not have under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, that 
standing could not be taken into account for the purposes of assessing the admissibility of the 
present action”,
62
 because the period for bringing proceedings had already expired when 
Article 263 TFEU entered into force on 1 December 2009. Did the Court’s choice of words 
(“even if …”) already reveal a reluctance to interpret the new standing rules for regulatory 
appeals generously? 
 
Considering the new formulation of Article 263 para 4 TFEU there are two elements that 
trigger question marks. First, the meaning of the term ‘regulatory act’ and, second, the phrase 
“does not entail implementing measures”. The latter element was clarified by the Court in 
Arcelor v Parliament and Council.
63
 Regarding the consequences of the entry into force of the 
fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, the Parliament and the Council, supported by the 
Commission, submitted that the new wording of the standing rules was not intended to alter 
too much. Whereas the institutions and the applicant focused their argument on whether the 
contested directive was a regulatory act within the terms of the new provision, the court only 
stipulated that the directive did entail implementing measures since “Member States have a 
broad discretion with regard to implementation of the contested directive”.  
By order of 6 September 2011 in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and 
Council,
64
 the General Court offered an interpretation of the new standing rules for actions 
against ‘regulatory acts’. Regulation No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products which imposed a 
ban on imports into the EU and sale of products deriving from all species of seals was 
contested by  a consortium of natural persons, commercial companies and non-profit-making 
organisations and associations representing Inuit interests, on the grounds that a) Article 95 
EC (now Article 114 TFEU) did not constitute a valid legal basis for the contested regulation, 
b) proportionality was infringed and c) their fundamental rights were violated. However the 
Court never got to deal with the substance of these arguments since the case crucially stranded 
on a standing issue and as such became a first landmark ruling on the interpretation of Article 
263 TFEU. It was quite clear that the applicants would not be individually concerned, but they 
might qualify for ‘directly concerned’ and the admissibility of their appeal therefore hinged 
on the applicability of of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU to the proceedings. The 
Court decided that the Regulation was not a regulatory act within the meaning of the fourth 
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Therefore the combined requirements of individuality and 
directness applied.
65
 Predictably – and in line with the pre-Lisbon case law – this resulted in 
the General Court declaring the applicants’ action inadmissible.
66
 




 Case T-16/04, 2 March 2010.  
64
 Case T-18/10. 
65
 “Secondly, it examined the possible direct effect of that regulation on the applicants’ situation, concluding, in 
paragraphs 85 and 86 of the order, that, with the exception of Ta Ma Su Seal Products Inc., NuTan Furs Inc., GC 




Let us take a closer look at the reasoning in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament 
and Council.
67
 The applicants - Inuit or associations representing Inuit - submit that the 
conditions of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU are fulfilled “inasmuch as there is a 
direct causal link between Regulation No 1007/2009 and the situation of each of the 
applicants, since the Member States have no discretion as regards its application and it is not 
necessary to adopt implementing measures in order for the prohibition set out in Article 3(1) 
of that regulation to be applicable”
68
. The counter stance put forward by the Parliament and 
the Council is that Regulation No 1007/2009 is a legislative act, “inasmuch as it was adopted 
by the co-decision procedure referred to in Article 251 EC”
69
 and which “must therefore be 
considered as coming within the same category as acts adopted in accordance with Article 
294 TFEU, which, according to the terms of Article 289(1) and (3) TFEU, are indeed 
legislative acts”. As a subsidiary argument the Parliament and the Council put forward that 
the action should not be admissible on the ground that Regulation No 1007/2009 requires 
implementing measures, “in particular with regard to the definition of the conditions under 
which the placing on the market of seal products resulting from hunts traditionally conducted 
by Inuit is to be allowed”. 
 
The Court engaged in extensive argumentation regarding the meaning of the term ‘regulatory 
act’ for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. After confirming that 
“although that provision introduces a change from the EC Treaty so far as concerns access to 
the Courts of the European Union […] the meaning of ‘regulatory act’ is not defined by the 
FEU Treaty”,
70
  the Court stated that it “must carry out a literal, historical and teleological 
interpretation of that provision”.
71
 According to the Court the fourth paragraph of Article 263 
TFEU adds a new possibility to the range of appealable decisions for individual applicants 
and that “[i]t is apparent from the ordinary meaning of the word ‘regulatory’ that the acts 
covered by that third possibility are also of general application”
72
. However the Court goes on 
to reason that “[a]gainst that background” the term ‘regulatory act’ “does not relate to all acts 
of general application, but to a more restricted category”
73
. The Court sets out to sum up the 
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“categories of acts of the European Union which may be subject to a review of legality, 
namely, first, legislative acts and, secondly, other binding acts intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties, which may be individual acts or acts of general application”
74
. 
The GC essentially reformulated the provision as follows: 
“It must be concluded that the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, read in conjunction 
with its first paragraph, permits a natural or legal person to institute proceedings against an act 
addressed to that person and also (i) against a legislative or regulatory act of general 
application which is of direct and individual concern to them and (ii) against certain acts of 




The Court also engaged in comparative linguistic interpretation when it looked at the 
words equivalent to the word ‘regulatory’ in the different language versions of the Treaty. In 
particular the Court investigated how the term is being used in juxtaposition to the word 
‘legislative’ in a number of other provisions of the Treaty, “in particular Article 114 TFEU, 
concerning the approximation of the ‘provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States’”
76
. The outcome of the exercise remains a bit unclear, 
but in any case it did not persuade the Court that ‘regulatory’ can be seen as an umbrella term. 
The GC did state that the scope of the final part of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU 
is not to limit the scope of that provision solely to delegated acts within the meaning of 
Article 290 TFEU, but more generally, to regulatory acts.
77
 The Court concluded that “the 
wording of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU does not allow proceedings to be 
instituted against all acts which satisfy the criteria of direct concern and which are not 
implementing measures or against all acts of general application which satisfy those criteria, 
but only against a specific category of acts of general application, namely regulatory acts. 
Consequently, the conditions of admissibility of an action for annulment of a legislative act 
are still more restrictive than in the case of proceedings instituted against a regulatory act.”
78
 
Contrary to Balthasar’s predictions,
79
 the Court also referred to the argumentation that 
was used when originally proposing the new provision in the process of designing the 
Constitutional Treaty (see above) in support of a restrictive reading of the new standing rules, 
arguing that the term ‘regulatory act’ had been deliberately chosen to secure limited locus 
standi. Considering that it seems to be this historical interpretation which sways the courts 
towards a restrictive interpretation, it is quite a stretch for the Court to use preparatory 
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materials of the Convention in support of a historical interpretation of a provision of the 
Lisbon Treaty, as Balthasar has pointed out.
80
 The ‘drafters’ intent’ is a precarious issue here, 
especially because it is a) unclear how many of the members of the discussion circle on the 
Court of Justice wanted to exclude legislative acts from direct challenge
81
 and b) very 
questionable whether these members can properly be considered ‘drafters’. Also the 
supporting materials used in the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty have not been published, 
nor have the negotiations reliably been reported on. This, however, seems to be an argument 
against relying on historical interpretation rather than a justification for referring to materials 
from another drafting process as an authoritative source. That said, it is clear that at the time 
the text of the current provision was drafted, this was done with the idea that ‘regulatory’ 
would come to denote all acts that are not of a ‘legislative’ nature in mind. In that reading, 
somewhere in the process of vetting the text of the Lisbon Treaty, someone simply forgot to 
replace the term ‘regulatory’ by ‘non-legislative’. In any case no recent proper discussion on 
who should have access to court to contest general rules in the post-Lisbon constellation has 
taken place at the level of the ‘constituent power’, or anything that comes close to it. We are 
left with the strange situation that a problem the court had refused to solve judicially because 
it is a ‘policy issue’, has been decided upon extra-judicially by member of that same court in 
the context of pre-deliberations for a constitutional text that never saw the light of day as such. 
The GC once more explicitly addressed the right to effective judicial protection as laid 
down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: “the Courts 
of the European Union may not, without exceeding their jurisdiction, interpret the conditions 
under which an individual may institute proceedings against a regulation in a way which has 
the effect of setting aside those conditions, expressly laid down in the Treaty, even in the light 
of the principle of effective judicial protection”.
82
 
The applicants had argued that a ‘broad’ interpretation of the fourth paragraph of 
Article 263 TFEU was warrented in view of “two international Conventions adopted within 
the context of the United Nations, namely the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters” but the 




The conclusion of the Court is that “the meaning of ‘regulatory act’ for the purposes of 
the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of general 
application apart from legislative acts”
84
. This means that for appeals against legislative acts, 
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the requirements of direct and individual concern – nearly impossible to satisfy for natural 
persons – still apply. According to the Court, since “the procedure defined in Article 294 
TFEU reproduces, in essence, that defined in Article 251 EC, it must be concluded that, 
within the categories of legal acts provided for by the FEU Treaty, the contested regulation 
must be categorised as a legislative act”. The applicants had submitted that the nature of an 
act is not determined by the procedure followed to adopt it, but by its scope, which can either 
be individual or general.
85
 In other words, “the adjective ‘regulatory’ should be interpreted as 
having its common meaning, namely as referring to an act that aims to lay down the 
applicable rules in general”
86
. The Court killed this line of reasoning as well, by stating that 
the categorisation of an act of general application “as a legislative act or a regulatory act 
according to the FEU Treaty is based on the criterion of the procedure, legislative or not, 
which led to its adoption”
87
. 
The Inuit case has been cited in another case regarding a ‘regulatory’ annulment, 
Microban International and Microban (Europe) v Commission.
88
 The applicants applied for 
an annulment of a Commission Decision
89
 concerning the non-inclusion of a certain additive 
(triclosan) in a list of substances which may be used in the manufacture of plastic materials 
and articles intended to come into contact with foodstuffs. However, in this case the Court 
arrived at the conclusion that the contested measure was in fact a ‘regulatory act’ – something 
the Commission had argued it was not. Since the applicants were not the addressees of the 
contested decision their only options to bring an action for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU were if the decision could either be seen as a regulatory act which is of direct concern 
to them and did not require implementing measures, or a decision of direct and individual 
concern to them. The difference with the Inuit case is therefore that here the question is 
whether the measure is general enough to qualify as ‘regulatory’, whereas in Inuit the measure 
was deemed ‘too legislative’. The Court repeats the definition of ‘regulatory act’ it gave in 
Inuit: “all acts of general application apart from legislative acts”.
90
 The Court decides that in 
the present case we have a ‘regulatory act’ at hand since the contested decision “was adopted 
by the Commission in the exercise of implementing powers and not in the exercise of 
legislative powers”
91
 and “is of general application in that it applies to objectively determined 
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situations and it produces legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in 




Conclusion: what change in regulatory dynamics? 
 
So the Court has spoken. The term ‘regulatory’ stands for a distinctive and limited category of 
acts; it is not an umbrella term for abstract and general norms, nor is it synonymous to the 
term ‘legislative’. It is fair to say that the Court played safe by interpreting the new standing 
provision in almost the most restrictive way possible. There does not seem to be much left of 
the ‘catalyst’ role, Scott and Sturm so optimistically observed a few years ago. Shapiro has 
pointed out that the position of the ECJ is very different from the position of the (highest) 
administrative courts in Member States possessing such courts, but rather more akin to a 
‘supreme court’, perhaps even the US Supreme Court.
93
 However, in cases such as Inuit the 
Court, in the capacity of the General Court in this instance, did adopt the formalistic reasoning 
often found in administrative courts. In order to answer the question how the recent case law 
fits with current thinking on the relationship between legislation proper and ‘lower’ forms of 
rulemaking in the EU, I draw out three points.  
First of all, the question arises what are regulatory acts then, concretely speaking? 
What category of decisions will fall within the scope of the newly set boundaries of 
‘regulatory locus standi’? To return to our analysis of pre-Lisbon case law, the Jégo-Quéré 
case under the new rules would have been admitted, as the contested regulation was of a ‘non-
legislative’ nature, namely an act adopted under delegation.  However, to the applicants in 
UPA, where the regulation at hand was what we would now call ‘legislative’, the new 
standing possibilities would not be of help.  Since Inuit we have seen examples of the kind of 
measures that will be increasingly fought in court,
94
 namely those with a strong impact on 
specific sectors, which the Court will be asked to review for breach of proportionality. This 
will put pressure on the Commission to further develop its emerging practice of impact 
assessments for non-legislative measures. From the non-legal perspective of Better Regulation 
though, what could really help further develop pre-legislative (and ‘pre-regulatory’ as we 
should now say) standards of care would be remedies against failures to act.
95
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Second, the question whether this interpretation of the new standing rules will 
reinforce the hierarchy of norms in the EU, should be answered affirmative in my view. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty did not embrace the hierarchy of legal norms in as principled a 
manner as as the unraveled European Constitution did,
 96
 the distinction between legislative 
and non-legislative acts now seems to be more firmly set. Indeed, at least implicitly, the ECJ’s 
reasoning in Inuit seems to rely on the logic of differing treatment of ‘primary’ and 
‘delegated’ legislation which is present most Member States’ legal systems. The argument 
here is that the risk of illegitimately overriding the preferences of the democratic majority is 
outweighed by the need to ensure consistency of lower norms and higher ones in the case of 
delegated legislation but not in the case of primary legislation. As such the stance taken in 
Inuit can be taken as judicial confirmation that EU legislative acts can be seen as the output of 
a proper democratic process and not as the product of ‘upwards’ delegation by the Member 
States. The recent developments also illustrate how the EU judicial system is grounded in the 
Germanic tradition, in which administrative courts typically only exercise control over 
concrete applications of rules. However, the Court at the moment seems to wear the hat of a 
‘supreme’ or even ‘constitutional’ court when it so pleases, and to resort to acting as an 
‘administrative’ court on other occasions. 
Even with a restrictive interpretation though, the new standing rules will allow for 
some interesting ‘regulatory’ case law in relation to the hierarchy of norms to develop. For 
instance, applicants contesting a ‘regulatory act’ could invoke Article 249B of the Treaty of 
Lisbon which only allows for delegation of ‘non-essential’ elements of a legislative act. As 
‘non-privileged applicants’ have the opportunity to bring such actions now, there will be more 
cases through which the Courts can develop the case law on prohibited delegation of essential 
elements.  The widening of the standing rules will mean that a greater variety of cases will be 
brought, and institutional interests will no longer be the primary driver of such cases. As more 
cases driven by economic interests primarily, such as Inuit, will be heard, further refinement 
of the case law on the use of impact assessment and related instruments in supporting 
proportionality analyses is to be expected.
97
 A second, more legal, issue to be developed 
further is how to deal with legislative acts that include the possibility of amendment of an 
annex or implementing measures through a non-legislative procedure. 
Third, we can ask whether we will see greater or lesser use of ‘non-legislative acts’ as 
a result of the new incentive structure created by the court. From the perspective of wanting to 
avoid excesses of regulatory litigation – such as ‘ossification’ or paralysis of the rulemaking 
institutions – does the distinction between legislative and regulatory acts make sense? 
Balthasar has argued that a wider scope of Article 263(4) would not significantly increase the 
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litigation case load for the EU institutions as the vast majority of regulations are of a non-
legislative nature in any case.
98
 However the number of initiatives published in the Official 
Journal and the number of pages they consist of do not say anything about the ‘regulatory 
impact’ those initiatives may have. On a positive note, the recent restrictive case law on 
standing may inadvertedly have given the EU Institutions an incentive to regulate more 
through legislative acts, thus providing a counterweight to the tendency to regulate more and 
more through delegated and implementing acts. However, this is not the result of a conscious 
and balanced consideration regarding the institutional structure of the EU, but of sloppy 
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